SOFTWARE ENGINEERING: A VITAL ROLE IN SPACE EXPLORATION
A variety of software supports space exploration. Flight software guides planetary orbiters, lander spacecraft, and space probes; navigation and hazard-avoidance software drive Martian rovers; onboard software acquires scientific data from rovers and instruments and transmits it back to Earth for further processing; operational software on Earth monitors and controls the missions; and analytical software helps scientists to visualize and interpret the results, and to apply the newly discovered knowledge to other problems on Earth.
Software engineering plays a vital role by providing tools, techniques, and a systematic approach to developing and servicing the many different kinds of software needed for space exploration. Advances such as model-based software development, formal verification, and product-line development help ensure that the software meets mission needs and that spacecraft operate safely and correctly.
Robotic spacecraft-unmanned vehicles controlled remotely by software commands sent from Earth or encoded in programs onboard the spacecraft-are the advance guard of space exploration because they can go to places well beyond the reach of human missions. Because many robotic spacecraft travel far and need to survive a long time, they must be exceedingly robust. To detect and respond to anomalies that occur during operations, their software is highly fault tolerant. Spacecraft teams also can update the software in flight to adapt to changes in the mission's needs or to accommodate component failure.
I
nnovations in robotic spacecraft are transforming space exploration. Spacecraft are becoming more software intensive to support smarter remote control, faster and more accurate troubleshooting during flight, and improved scientific data gathering and analysis to gain a better understanding of our universe.
NASA spacecraft launched or set to launch this year have missions to map the moon's gravitational field (Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory, GRAIL; http:// science.nasa.gov/missions/grail), study how Jupiter and other giant planets formed (Juno; http://science1.nasa.gov/ missions/juno), and land a new robotic rover, Curiosity, to investigate the Martian environment (Mars Science Laboratory, MSL; http://mars.jpl.nasa.gov/msl).
Despite engineers' best efforts, exploration is perilous for robotic spacecraft in both near-Earth and deep space environments. Some environmental factors are hostile to onboard software systems. For example, radiation-induced bit flips can cause software to fail or operate improperly. While some surprises are welcome-for example, Voyager 2 witnessed a rare supernova-other unexpected events or circumstances can cripple or destroy systems.
Software engineering offers tools and techniques that improve the odds spacecraft will survive long missions, contributing to their resilience to new environmental challenges and to their adaptability to updated mission requirements.
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Software Engineering for Space Exploration
While the focus here is on robotic spacecraft developed or managed by NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), other NASA facilities as well as international space agencies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_space_agencies), commercial organizations, and research institutions produce software for space exploration missions. Limited budgets, different areas of expertise, risk sharing, and cooperative opportunities all encourage collaboration among multiple entities to achieve what no single one could. Multinational collaboration has become a hallmark of space exploration. For example, the 2016-2018 Exobiology on Mars (ExoMars) Trace Gas Orbiter is a joint European Space Agency/NASA-JPL mission that will study the sources of methane and other gases on Mars (http:// exploration.esa.int).
DESIGNING FOR CHANGE
A space exploration mission typically evolves over time. Software systems must be designed to accommodate this change, especially on long-lived spacecraft traveling to distant planets. The New Horizons spacecraft launched in 2006 to study Pluto and its moons will not reach its destination until 2015 (http://pluto.jhuapl.edu).
Software engineering for spacecraft thus devotes considerable effort to anticipating and planning for change. Some changes involve updates to requirements; others entail updates to onboard software technology, such as improved image compression algorithms or additional autonomous reconfiguration options. The spacecraft must also be robust enough to maintain its essential functional capabilities despite failures.
Mission teams regularly update spacecraft software during operations, fixing bugs, uploading adaptations to contextual changes, and enhancing what the software can do or how well it can do it. On long-distance missions, they often develop the software needed for later surface or orbit operations during flight. Changes and augmentation after launch let engineers sequentially update and customize software to the mission's next phase. The "Deep Space: The Farthest Human-Made Objects" sidebar describes instances in which Voyager 2 engineers had to develop new algorithms for ground and flight software.
The ability to update software during operations is essential. A study of 199 critical, software-related postlaunch anomalies on seven spacecraft revealed that about 7 percent resulted in a new software requirement either to handle a rare but high-consequence event-for example, failure of redundant units-or to accommodate hardware failures or limitations.
1 Such requirement changes are typical of systems in which the hardware is inaccessible (such as spacecraft) or difficult to access (such as implanted medical devices), or where the operating environment is dangerous (for example, high radiation levels or extreme temperatures). In such systems, software often must be updated to compensate for hardware failure or degradation.
Many spacecraft and rovers have excellent hardware and software reliability, allowing them to far exceed their planned mission lifetimes. For example, the twin Mars Exploration Rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, finished their original 90-day primary mission in 2004 but, 90 months later, Opportunity still continues its trek across Mars (http://marsrover.nasa.gov).
The software architecture for spacecraft is thus designed to accommodate changes. Given the turnover in engineering personnel that can occur over a mission's DEEP SPACE: THE FARTHEST HUMAN-MADE OBJECTS T he two Voyager spacecraft, launched in 1977, are now the farthest human-made objects from Earth. They continue to return invaluable data as they approach the heliopause, the boundary of the sun's solar winds (http://voyager.jpl.nasa.gov).
Voyager 2 recently discovered a strong magnetic field that holds together the interstellar cloud. For the spacecraft to get that far, mission engineers had to update its software during flight.
Soon after launch, Voyager 2's primary receiver failed, and its backup receiver was reduced to a very narrow, changing frequency band. Software engineering practices helped the mission team respond quickly to the problem. They designed and implemented a new algorithm that enabled ground operations to tune the transmission of software commands to the receiver's current state.
Among the software updates was a new algorithm required to obtain crisp images of Neptune at low sunlight levels, like that in Figure A . The algorithm automatically fired the spacecraft's attitude jets to compensate for torque imparted at the longer exposure rate. lifetime and the likelihood that altered circumstances will result in modifications to the software requirements, it is important to retain the reasoning behind design decisions and flight rules. This helps prevent the introduction of errors when software is updated.
FAULT TOLERANCE
Fault tolerance is a specialized kind of planning for change. Given the long lives of spacecraft and the hostile environments they encounter, failures are expected. Developing robust software that can handle failures and other conditions that threaten the mission begins with a thorough systems and software hazards analysis. Developers derive software requirements to protect the spacecraft from mission-critical failures from these hazards analyses.
An example of successful fault tolerance occurred when the Cassini spacecraft, currently on an extended mission to Saturn and its satellites (http://saturn.jpl.nasa.gov), ceased communication with ground operations on 2 November 2010. The Cassini team later determined that this was caused by a flipped bit. The onboard fault-protection software quickly switched to a backup computer, shut off nonessential power loads, and activated an alternate lowgain antenna, pointing it toward the sun to improve the chances of reaching human operators. Communication was restored within the hour, at which point the operators began a slow and careful check of the spacecraft, followed by recovery activities such as clearing error log files and reactivating scientific instruments. These actions were completed on 24 November, and Cassini continues its science mission today.
Fault-protection software on spacecraft continually monitors for discrepancies between the expected and actual state. This software is especially important because the system usually invokes it when something has already gone wrong. As spacecraft and space exploration missions become more complicated, the number of potential undesirable scenarios increases. Software must handle not just failures, as was the case with the Cassini bit flip, but also a range of novel usage situations and unexpected contingencies, such as debris temporarily blinding the spacecraft camera. However, extending onboard fault-protection techniques to cover a wider range of software problems can also increase algorithmic complexity, which makes verifying the software more difficult.
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AUTONOMY
To accommodate the long distances between spacecraft and Earth, ground operators must give the spacecraft some autonomy. The round-trip light time (RTLT) to send a radio signal command to Cassini and receive an acknowledgment is more than two and a half hours. Many activities must be accomplished much faster than this, forcing human operators to provide limited real-time control to the remote robotic spacecraft's software.
For example, when the spacecraft for the Mars Exploration Rovers (MER) mission landed in 2004, onboard software used radar, image, and sensor data to track and respond to wind velocity. "Had DIMES [the Descent Image Motion Estimation System] not been available to measure the steady state velocity," a subsequent report noted, "the EDL [Entry-Descent-Landing] system would not have fired TIRS [the retro rockets] and the total velocity would have been just on the threshold of airbag performance. Furthermore, the velocity would have been to the East toward the rockier terrain." 3 The MER Opportunity Rover, for which the RTLT is currently about 40 minutes, routinely drives itself short distances. The MSL Curiosity Rover, to be launched later this year, has autonomous navigation software that allows it to devise a plan and drive to an interesting feature as far as 50 meters away while avoiding hazards in its way. 2004, the software detected it and prompted EO-1 to collect additional event data within six hours; without ASE self-direction, the response time would have been from 12 to 26 days. Two years later, acting as part of NASA's Volcano Sensor Web, EO-1 collected precise data regarding the eruption and expected direction of the lava flow from the Nyamuragira Volcano near a populated area in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo to help planners on the ground. 4 The autonomy ASE provides was estimated to reduce EO-1 mission costs by more than $1 million per year. Software engineering techniques that contribute to its high reliability include a redundant, layered architecture and supporting models; a rigorous systems and requirements engineering process; a multilevel testing process; and incremental spiral development.
5
GRAPPLING WITH GROWTH
A simple system is easier to understand and hence easier to build correctly, test, and update as needed over time. However, improved knowledge discovery will depend on more and better data, and on smarter spacecraft to acquire and process such data. Making spacecraft smarter in terms of adaptability (to respond to new mission requirements), fault tolerance (to isolate and recover quickly from failures), and autonomy (to make onboard decisions without human intervention) encourages the development of bigger and more complicated software.
As Figure 2 shows, the size of human and robotic NASA missions from 1968 through 2005, as measured in thousands of noncommentary source lines (KNCSLs) of code, has increased by a factor of 10 approximately every 10 years. 2 One of the key challenges of software engineering for spacecraft is how to handle this exponential growth in code size. Unlike other systems, once a spacecraft has been launched, there is no way to pull it back into the shop to repair it. Smarter but more fragile software is an unacceptable tradeoff.
An example of how easy it is to introduce a critical design flaw and how hard it can be to fix it in flight is the "Sol 18" anomaly that occurred on the MER Spirit rover on 21 January 2004. An error in a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) file services module allowed incorrect dynamic memory allocation during operation. Two configuration errors then compounded the impact of this design flaw. As a result, out-of-memory events caused repeated processor resets that interrupted communication with operators on Earth and depleted battery power, threatening the spacecraft's mission.
A protective feature in the software design called "crippled mode" was essential to the rover's eventual recovery. This contingency mode enabled the MER team to prevent continuous resets and, after two weeks of intensive team effort, restore the spacecraft's functionality. "Without this capability, the MER mission may well have been lost," noted team members Glenn Reeves and Tracy Neilson. "The crippled mode mechanism allowed us to regain control of the vehicle." 6 This incident highlighted the importance of assuring compaction for deleted files in the directory structures for long-duration missions, the difficulty of understanding and managing all interactions, the risk of unexpected behavior by COTS software, the criticality of verifying operational assumptions, the need for telemetry that reveals the current software state, the impracticality of operational tests long enough to reveal such behavior (in this case, over 11 sols, or Martian days), and the central role of automated test data analysis.
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING IN EMBEDDED SYSTEMS
Software engineering goes hand-in-hand with systems engineering on robotic spacecraft. As part of a larger system, the software monitors and controls the devices in the system. Software engineering is fundamental to the integrated infrastructure that makes spacecraft exploration possible.
Experience with the Galileo spacecraft exemplifies how any software solution must take into account broader system and environmental interactions. The spacecraft's high-gain antenna (HGA), which had been folded up like an umbrella during launch in 1989, failed to unfurl when commanded to do so in 1991. During the four years before Galileo's arrival at Jupiter, engineers made extraordinary efforts to open the antenna. Without the HGA, the spacecraft could transmit to Earth only a small percentage of the scientific data it collected. 1968  1970  1972  1974  1976  1978  1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  2004 Year of mission KNCSLs (log scale) Unmanned Manned The solution involved what team members Erik Nilsen and Trisha Jansma called the "first complete reload of flight software ever performed on a deep-space mission." 7 But recovery from the HGA anomaly required more than just a software solution. The workarounds "were truly a team effort involving a system approach that included science, flight, ground, hardware, and software." High-rate data from the Jupiter encounter would need to be buffered so that it could slowly trickle to Earth over the low-gain antenna (LGA).
To accomplish this, the mission team uploaded new data-processing and data-compression software that let Galileo send 10 times the number of images and data than was otherwise possible without the HGA. They also made hardware and software improvements to the deep-space network that the spacecraft used to communicate with Earth, including advanced antenna arraying, low-noise receivers, and improved modulation schemes. These changes greatly increased the amount of data that could be received from Galileo. While the data returned did not equal what was envisioned in the original plan, the effective data downlink increased more than 400 times, from 10 bits per second (the LGA rate) to about 4.5 Kbps, enabling most of the mission's goals to be achieved.
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
Many of the software engineering techniques (such as hazards analysis, requirements-based testing, and formal verification) used for other safety-critical systems (such as airplanes, cars, pacemakers, power plants, and factoryfloor robots) have been adapted and extended for space exploration. The flow of ideas is two-way, resulting in many market spin-offs.
Software engineering solutions for robotic spacecraft that have been applied to other similar systems include model-based diagnostics and recovery, design for reuse, risk management, delay-tolerant network software (which preserves loss-less communication even if communication is slow or interrupted), distributed sensor network technologies, redundancy management, product-line engineering, and resource-constrained (power, memory, mass, bandwidth) system design.
JPL's Laboratory for Reliable Software (LaRS; http:// lars-lab.jpl.nasa.gov) develops technologies to improve software on spacecraft and other mission elements. Many of these advances can increase software robustness and productivity in other critical as well as noncritical domains. Examples include model checking to verify critical components and interfaces such as the MSL spacecraft's flash file system for flight, static source code analyzers as standard practice, and institutional coding standards that can reduce risk related to multithreaded software. LaRS also developed a software tool, called SCRUB, to support code reviews. The SCRUB software combines results from multiple source code analyzers with results from code walk-throughs to make the review process more efficient and the code more reliable. It has been used on the MSL project for three years for all reviews of both manually written code and code autogenerated from high-level formats. 8 The long operational lifetimes of many space exploration missions inevitably involve personnel turnover. This means that the documentation, preservation, and maintenance of knowledge about the spacecraft are especially important for such systems. Software product-line engineering techniques offer a promising means to help software designers of single, long-lived robotic spacecraft identify options, document assumptions, and make decisions regarding alternatives and changes, based on cost and value, during both development and operations. 9 By modeling anticipated change as variability, making such a change after launch is comparable to making different choices for a new product.
Spacecraft mission design balances highly innovative technologies that promise more and better scientific data with an aversion to risk driven by unique opportunities. For example, only about once every 175 years do the planets Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune line up so that a single spacecraft can fly past all of them, as Voyager 2 did.
More broadly, many findings and techniques from developing software for space exploration missions transfer readily to other safety-critical systems:
• rare events do occur and must be planned for, • static analysis and requirements-based testing significantly reduce operational defects, • overly strict requirements unnecessarily add complexity and consequent risk, • traceability to requirements and rationale forestalls injection of design defects, • it is important to design not just for failures but also for undesirable contingencies, • restraint in the introduction of complexity reduces risk, • requirements always change over the system's lifetime, • partial autonomy enables scientific gains not otherwise possible because of long communication times, Many findings and techniques from developing software for space exploration missions transfer readily to other safety-critical systems.
• time invested in a well-thought-out architectural design pays off in increased sustainability, • there is no substitute for expertise and the power of a committed design team, and • model-based engineering and good traceability can reduce loss of knowledge over the lifetime of a longlived system.
Despite the achievements of software engineering for space exploration, many challenges remain. One that is essential to address is the analysis, visualization, and management of very large amounts of scientific data. For example, the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (http:// mars.jpl.nasa.gov/mro), which was launched in August 2005 and went into orbit the following March, gathered 100 terabits of data in its first four years. This was more than three times the data collected up to then by all other deep-space robotic spacecraft combined. Another area of interest is the software engineering of multiple, distributed, formation-flying spacecraft, perhaps with some having specialized scientific instruments that can cooperate to learn about space in ways not previously possible.
A s the capabilities of robotic spacecraft increase, the need for software engineering for space exploration will continue to grow. "Exploration is in our nature," Carl Sagan famously said. "We began as wanderers, and we are wanderers still. We have lingered long enough on the shores of the cosmic ocean. We are ready at last to set sail for the stars." 10 Or, as one JPL engineer put it: "If you can't have a good time coming to work and building robots to send to Mars, give it up, man." 11 
